








Spatial Sorting:  
Why New York, Los Angeles and Detroit 









CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3274 





An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Spatial Sorting:  
Why New York, Los Angeles and Detroit 





We propose a theory of skill mobility across cities. It predicts the well documented city size-
wage premium: the wage distribution in large cities first-order stochastically dominates that in 
small cities. Yet, because this premium is reflected in higher house prices, this does not 
necessarily imply that this stochastic dominance relation also exists in the distribution of 
skills. Instead, we find there is second-order stochastic dominance in the skill distribution. 
The demand for skills is non-monotonic as our model predicts a “Sinatra” as well as an 
“Eminem” effect: both the very high and the very low skilled disproportionately sort into the 
biggest cities, while those with medium skill levels sort into small cities. The pattern of 
spatial sorting is explained by a technology with a varying elasticity of substitution that is 
decreasing in skill density. Using CPS data on wages and Census data on house prices, we 
find that this technology is consistent with the observed patterns of skills. 
JEL-Code: J31, R10, R23. 
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1 Introduction
New York, NY. Making it there rather than in Akron, OH is the ultimate aim of many professionals.
And this is true for many trades and skills: artists, musicians, advertising and media professional,
consultants, lawyers, nanciers,... While there are certainly notable exceptions (the IT sector comes to
mind), most people can provide casual evidence that the skill level in the top percentiles of NY and
large cities in general is higher than anywhere else. Yet, to date there is little or no empirical evidence
to back this up. While there is certainly ample evidence of a city-size wage premium, there is little
evidence of sorting of both the skilled and the unskilled across dierent size cities.
In this paper we show that there is indeed evidence of spatial sorting and that disproportionately
more skilled citizens locate in larger cities. However, we provide a key new insight: larger cities also
disproportionately attract lower skilled agents. For example, in New York city there is a huge low skill
contingent in the South Bronx and Newark as well as the high skilled mainly living in Manhattan.
Similarly, while Detroit has disproportionately many low skilled individuals and a reputation for inner
city poverty, it also disproportionately attracts high skilled individuals, many of whom live in the
wealthy neighborhood of Bloomeld Hills. In that respect, large cities like New York and Detroit are
more similar to each other than to small cities. We show that there is a systematic pattern of fat tails
in the skill distribution of large cities. To our knowledge, this pattern of spatial sorting has not been
documented in the literature.
We propose a theory of city choice and heterogeneous skills that rationalizes this pattern of fat
tails for larger cities. The main innovation of our theory is that it generates a pattern of sorting that
does not involve perfect segregation of skills across cities. Consistent with reality, in our model cities
attract all skill types, yet to a varying extent. Citizens earn a living based on a competitive wage, and
under perfect mobility, their location choice will make them indierent between consumption-housing
bundles, and therefore between dierent wage-house price pairs across cities. Wages are generated by
rms that compete for labor and that have access to a city-specic technology summarized by that city's
total factor productivity (TFP).1 Output is produced with heterogeneous labor inputs. The technology
values higher skills, but the marginal product of labor is decreasing in the number of workers hired of
that skill level. As a result, given a vector of wages, rms want to hire a combination of dierent skills.
Since under the assumptions of our model, in equilibrium there is a one-to-one relationship between
wages and skills within each city, we are able to use revealed preference choices of location and wages
1While realistically it is determined endogenously, for the purpose of our model we take it is as given and assume it is
not aected directly by investment by individuals or institutions. A local government may be able to aect its city-specic
TFP through investment, for example in local transportation or the construction of an airport.
1paid to back out skills.
We nd that, for general production technologies, the size of the city is increasing with TFP and we
can establish that wages are higher in larger cities. Firms in high TFP cities are more productive and
can attract workers paying higher wages. In equilibrium, labor demand will also push up house prices.
The cititzens' location decision will equalize utility and a worker of a given skill will be indierent
between a high wage, high house price city and a low wage, low house price city. The shape of the skill
distribution is crucially determined by the technology. In the benchmark case of Constant Elasticity
of Substitution (CES), cities of dierent TFP have dierent population sizes, but the distribution of
skills is the same across cities, and for that matter across the entire economy. In contrast, when the
elasticity of substitution varies across skill levels, distributions across cities dier. In particular, when
the elasticity is decreasing in the measure of a given skill, then larger cities have skill distributions with
fatter tails.
Our empirical analysis documents the systematic sorting pattern that leads to fat tails in large
cities. From the theory we construct a price-theoretic measure of skills, based on revealed preference
location choices given wages and house prices. Consider rst the distribution of wages. The city-size
wage premium is well documented. For example, the gap between average wages in the smallest cities
in our sample (with a population around 160,000, more than 100 times smaller than New York) and the
largest cities is 25%. Below in Figure 1.A, we plot a kernel of the wage distribution of those living in all
cities larger than 2.5 million inhabitants and that of those in cities smaller than one million inhabitants.
Not only are average wages higher, there is a clear rst-order stochastic dominance relation. At all wage
levels, more people earn less in small cities than in large cities. This clearly indicates that there is a
city-size wage premium across the board.
However, larger cities tend to be more expensive to live, so in order to be able to compare skill
distributions, we need to adjust for house prices. Identical agents will make a location choice based on
the utility obtained, which depends both on wages and the cost of housing. Indierence for identical
agents will therefore require equalizing dierences. We use homothetic preferences to adjust for housing
consumption and construct a house price index based on a hedonic regression to calculate the dierence
in housing values across cities. From the theory, the resulting distribution of utilities is therefore
isomorphic to the distribution of skills in a world with full mobility and no market frictions. Figure 1.B
displays the kernel of the skill distribution. Our main nding is that the skill distribution in larger cities
has fatter tails both at the top and at the bottom of the distribution. Large cities disproportionately
attract more skilled and more unskilled workers. This systematic pattern of spatial sorting is extremely
robust as we document in the discussion: we consider dierent denitions of large vs. small cities,
use three dierent data sources for local housing values, include local price dierences in consumption
goods and analyze the observable part of skills by educational attainment.
The fat tails imply that the relative demand for skills is non-monotonic. In large cities, there is
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Figure 1: Left-to-right-top-to-bottom. A. Wage distribution for small and large cities; B. Skill distri-
bution for small and large cities; C. Density dierential of wages between large and small cities; D.
Density dierential of skills between large and small cities.
is relatively low. Figure 1.D illustrates this non-monotonic relative demand pattern. In contrast, relative
wages are monotonic (Figure 1.C).
A key feature of our approach is the price-theoretic measure of skills. This is in contrast to the
common approach of using observable skills such as years of education or test scores. Not only do
observables explain a mere fraction of skills (see for example Keane and Wolpin (1997)), observed skill
categories are typically very coarse. In the literature, skills are often partitioned into two classes,2 which
allows for inference of a linear approximation when the underlying relation is monotonic. Given the
non-monotonicity observed using our approach { that relative to small cities, the equilibrium demand
for skills in large cities is U-shaped in skill { there is no hope to satisfactorily identify this non-monotonic
relation with two points only. Once we allow for many skill classes using the wage based measure, we
are able to characterize a smooth distributions of skills.
2The same is true when the focus is on occupations instead of skills. Gould (2007) partitions the set of workers into
blue and white collar occupations.
3In addition to our wage based measure, we nonetheless also analyze the skill distribution based on
observable skills, either by schooling category or actual years of schooling, derived from self-reported
educational attainment in the CPS data. We nd the same qualitative prediction of fatter tails and
second order stochastic dominance in larger cities.
2 Related Literature
There is a long tradition in the Urban Economics literature investigating dierences across city sizes, in
particular with respect to varying standards of living between cities. We are also not the rst to study
wages across cities. Behrens, Duranton and Robert-Nicoud (2010) regress log nominal wages on log city
size across 276 MSA areas using 2000 Census data. They nd an average urban premium of 8% without
controlling for talent, measured by education, and 5% when controlling for it. In addition, they regress
housing costs on city size using both rental prices and an index formed of rental price and housing
values of owner-occupied units. They nd similar coecients for housing costs as for nominal wages,
suggesting that there is no substantial dierence in real wages. This is consistent with our nding that
the mean of house-price adjusted wages is the same. They do not analyze the higher variance in larger
cities.
Albouy (2008) calculates real urban wages for 290 MSAs using the 2000 Census (5% IPUMS).
Nominal wages are deated using rental prices from the Census and local prices for consumption goods.
The ACCRA Cost-of-Living index is the basis of the latter but not directly used because of its limited
quality. Albouy regresses the ACCRA index on local rental prices and uses the predicted values as
an index for local cost-of-living dierences. Dierences in real wages across MSAs are interpreted
as quality-of-life dierences. He nds that controlling for local dierences in federal taxes, non-labor
income and observable amenities such as seasons, sunshine, and coastal location, quality of life does
not depend on city size.
All this body is consistent with our nding that the average of the skill distribution is remarkably
constant across dierent size cities. Of course, that does not allow us to conclude that there is no
sorting or that there is sorting of high skilled workers in large cities and low skilled workers in small
cities. As we will show below, quite to the contrary. The mean is constant across cities of dierent size,
but the variance is signicantly increasing. The latter indicates an important role of sorting of high
and low types into large cities and of medium types into small cities.
Our ndings are also related to the previous literature on variations of skill distributions across city
sizes. Bacolod, Blum and Strange (2009) study the dierence in skill distributions across city sizes,
using jointly Census and NLSY data and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), dening skills
as a combination of qualities instead of just education. They nd a small variation in cognitive, people,
and motor skills across city sizes, which they attribute to skills being dened nationally, not being
able to address local dierences in occupational requirements of skills. Once they look at dierences
4in the Armed Forces Qualication Test (AFQT) and the Rotter Index { measures of intelligence and
social skills, respectively { they nd that, even though the average scores are quite similar across city
sizes, the scores at large cities for the lowest scores (10th percentile) are much lower than the ones at
small cities. Similarly, the highest scores (90th percentile) were much higher in large cities than small
ones. These results corroborate the idea that we have fat tails in the distribution of skills, even though
dierences in average skill may be small.
The model we propose builds on the urban location model in Eeckhout (2004) and Davis and Ortalo-
Magn e (2009) where identical citizens who have preferences over consumption and housing choose a
city in order to maximize utility. Because of dierences in productivity across cities, wages dier and
house prices adjust in function of the population size of the city. Productivity dierences are due to
TFP and agglomeration eects. Given perfect mobility and identical agents, utility equalizes across
cities. Here we add heterogeneity in the inputs of production (skills) which gives rise to a distribution
of skills within the city. The production technology aggregates dierent skilled inputs within a rm
without assuming a constant elasticity of substitution technology as in Eeckhout and Pinheiro (2010).
Equilibrium is determined by the sorting decision of agents. The work by Behrens, Duranton and
Robert-Nicoud (2010) also analyzes sorting of heterogeneous agents into cities. They nd that more
productive workers locate in large cities and less productive workers in small cities. As a result, they
predict as we do the eect in the upper tail, however not that in the lower tail.
3 The Model
Population. Consider an economy with heterogeneously skilled workers. Workers are indexed by a skill
type i. For now, let the types be discrete and given by the order: i 2 I = f1;:::;Ig. Associated with
this skill order is a level of productivity y

i ; > 0, where yi is increasing in i. Denote the country-wide
measure of skills of type i by Mi. Let there be J locations (cities) j 2 J = f1;:::;Jg. The amount of
land in a city is xed and denoted by Hj: Land is a scarce resource.
Preferences. Citizens of skill type i who live in city j have preferences over consumption cij; and the
amount of land (or housing) hij. The consumption good is a numeraire good with price equal to one.
The price per unit of land is denoted by pj. We think of the expenditure on housing as the ow value
that compensates for the depreciation, interest on capital, etc. In a competitive rental market, the ow





where  2 [0;1]: Workers and rms are perfectly mobile, so they can relocate instantaneously and at
3We will abstract from the housing production technology, for example we can assume that the entire housing stock is
held by a zero measure of landlords.
5no cost to another city. Because workers with the same skill are identical, in equilibrium each of them
should obtain the same utility level wherever they choose to locate. Therefore for any two cities j;j0 it
must be the case that:
u(cij;hij) = u(cij0;hij0);
for all skill types 8i 2 f1;:::;Ig.
Technology. Cities dier in their total factor productivity (TFP) which is denoted by Aj. We treat this
as exogenous and representing a city's productive amenities, infrastructure, historical industries, etc.4
In each city, rms compete to operate in this market. Firms are all assumed to be identical and to
have access to the same, city-specic TFP. Output is produced from choosing the right mix of dierent









where i is skill-dependent. When i is constant for all i, this technology is the standard CES (constant
elasticity of substitution). Because i is skill-varying, we refer to this technology as VES (varying
elasticity of substitution). Firms pay wages wij for workers of type i. It is important to note that wages
will depend on the city j because citizens freely locate between cities not based on the highest wage,
but given house price dierences, based on the highest utility.
Entry into the market entails a cost kj that in general is city specic. In particular, we will assume
that rms need to buy a constant amount of k units of land in the city in order to engage in economic
activity. Firms need to rent housing space for production and house prices aect the expenditure that
a rm incurs to nance infrastructure. As a result, the rm's entry cost is kpj.5 Competitive entry will










wijmij   kpj = 0:
The measure of rms entering the market in city j is denoted by Nj and is determined by this zero
prot condition and the market clearing conditions below.
Market Clearing. In the country-wide market for skilled labor, markets for skills clear market by market:
J X
j=1
Njmij = Mi; 8i:
4We assume this exogenous because our focus is on the allocation of skills across cities, but one can easily think of this
being the outcome of investment choices made by rms, local governments,...
5This particular assumption is not crucial for any of our results. We make the assumption because it is realistic and in
some of the derivations the dependence on pj simplies the expressions.









Within a city there are a measure of Nj identical rms, each of which demands k units of land to
operate in the market and each employs mij skilled workers of each skill i who demand hij units of land
for housing.
4 The Equilibrium Allocation
The Citizen's Problem. Within a given city j and given a wage schedule wij, a citizen chooses con-
sumption bundles fcij;hijg to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint (where the tradable






s.t. cij + pjhij  wij
for all i;j. Solving for the competitive equilibrium allocation for this problem we obtain:




Substituting the equilibrium values in the utility function, we can write the indirect utility for a type i
as:
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s.t. mij  0;8i





All rms are price-takers and do not aect wages. Wages are determined simultaneously in each
submarket i;j. Even without fully solving the system of equations for the equilibrium wages, observation
of the rst-order condition reveals that productivity between dierent skills i in a given city are governed
by two components: (1) the productivity yi of the skilled labor and how fast it changes between dierent
i (determined by ); and (2) the measure of skills mij employed (wages decrease in the measure employed
from the concavity of the technology). It is conceivable that the second eect dominates the rst eect
in the upward sloping part of the skill density. Suppose skills barely increase in i, yet the density is
very steep. Adjacent skills are very abundant even though they are more productive. As a result, the
wages of the higher skilled types could be lower. Instead, for a given skill distribution, if productivity
is suciently increasing, i.e. dy

i =di is suciently large, then wages will always be increasing. In order
to avoid the possible reordering of skills, we assume that wages are monotonic in the original order i
by making the following mild assumption.
Assumption 1 Productivity-skill monotonicity. For a given economy, there exists a critical ? such
that for every  > ? productivity is increasing in skill i in every city j.
Since wages are equal to marginal product, this implies that wages are increasing in the order of
skills i. This is without loss of generality if one interprets the order of skills to be determined by the
marginal product, i.e., we have a price-theoretic foundation for skill. Of course, even if this assumption
is not satised, the analysis still goes through. We can reorder skill types and replace i by an order ~ i
such that wages are increasing. Then the analysis applies for the distribution of skills on the order ~ i.
This might be the case for the average artist or architect for example, who in terms of years of schooling
are more skilled than accountants, yet they earn less. In our price theoretic view of skills, the account
would be more skilled than the artist.
Since utility is increasing in skills and equalized across cities, the utility distribution is therefore a
monotonic transformation of the skill distribution. The skill distribution may have a dierent shape
than the utility distribution, but its ordinal features are preserved. In particular, if we compare two
utility distributions, the densities of which intersect twice, then also the skill densities will intersect
twice. In other words, if there are fat tails in the utility distribution, then there are also fat tails in the
skill distribution.
In order to simplify the exposition and the derivations, we now proceed the analysis with two cities
j = 1;2 and any number I of skills. From the labor market clearing condition and using the rst-order
6In what follows, the non-negativity constraints on mij will be dropped since the technology satises the Inada condition,
marginal product at zero tends to innity whenever i and Aj are positive.
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and analogously for wi2.
Even though we have not closed the model yet, it is important at this stage to note that wages depend
only on the quantity of aggregate skills Mi and not on the city level quantity mij. This underscores
the importance of the general equilibrium eect from mobility: quantities respond to arbitrage until
the wage-price ratio is constant across all pairs, and as a result, wages are pinned down only by the




data by regressing wages on the quantity of labor in a given city is therefore completely uninformative,
except in the unrealistic case of zero mobility.
Finally, the equilibrium is fully specied once we satisfy market clearing in the housing market in
each city and we pin down the measure of rms Nj from the zero prot condition. We can therefore



































































































































In what follows we refer to these as the four equilibrium conditions (1){(4).
The Main Theoretical Results. First we consider the case where the technology has a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES). This provides a benchmark for our main ndings about the distribution of skills
across cities.
Theorem 1 CES technology. If i =  for all i, then the skill distribution across cities is identical.
Proof. In Appendix.
The CES technology implies that cities have identical skill compositions. This is due to the ho-
motheticity of the CES technology: the marginal rate of technical substitution is proportional to total
employment, and as a result, rms in dierent cities and with dierent technologies will employ dierent
skills in the same proportions.
We now establish the relation between TFP and city size. Denote by Sj the size of city j where
Sj =
PI
i=1 Njmij. When cities have the same amount of land, we can establish the following result for
a general technology.
Proposition 1 City Size and TFP. Let A1 > A2 and H1 = H2, then S1 > S2 .
Proof. In Appendix.
We establish this result for cities with identical supply of land. Clearly, the supply of land is
important in our model since in a city with an extremely tiny geographical area, labor demand would
drive up housing prices all else equal. This may therefore make it more expensive to live even if the
10productivity is lower. Because in our empirical application we consider large metropolitan areas (NY
city for example includes large parts of New Jersey and Connecticut with relatively low population
density), we believe that this assumption is without much loss of generality.7
We now proceed to showing the main result. We already know that more productive cities are
larger, but that does not necessarily mean that the distribution of skills in larger cities diers from that
in smaller cities. In fact, it depends on the technology. We know from Theorem 1 that for the CES
technology the large cities have exactly the same distribution as the smaller cities.
We therefore make the following assumption on how the coecient i varies with i. Below, we
provide a simple micro-foundation for this assumption.
Assumption 2 i is decreasing in the economy-wide density of skill i.
In other words, scarce skills have a higher i than abundant skills. This is illustrated in Figure 4. It
is important to note here that i does not depend on the rm's employment in skill i. This would aect
the rm's rst order condition as it will take into account how the marginal product is aected by the
change in mij. Because the rm is innitesimally small relative to the market, it takes the aggregate









Figure 2: Scarce skill types have a higher i, implying a higher level of productivity and a higher a
marginal productivity.
We can now establish the main theorem characterizing the skill distribution across rms:
7In fact, the equal supply of housing condition is only sucient for the proof, not necessary. However, our model
does not speak to the important issue of within-city geographical heterogeneity, as analyzed for example in Lucas and
Rossi-Hansberg (2002). In our application, all heterogeneity is absorbed in the pricing index by means of the hedonic
regression. Moreover, in recent work Fu and Ross (2010) nd little evidence of sorting within metropolitan areas based
on agglomeration.
11Theorem 2 Fat Tails. Consider a symmetric, uni-modal skill distribution economy-wide. Then under
Assumption 2, A1 > A2; and H1 = H2, the skill distribution in larger cities has fatter tails.
Proof. In Appendix.
To see the intuition behind this result, consider rst the benchmark of CES. Homotheticity implies
that even though the level of employment diers across skills, rms will always choose to hire dierent
skills in exactly the same proportions for a given wage ratio. Since house prices aect all skills within
a city in the same way, the wage ratio is unaected. Now consider the case of VES, by increasing
the marginal product for low and high skilled workers, leaving that of the medium skilled at the CES
level. This increase in marginal productivity will be larger in large cities because they have higher TFP
and TFP and skills are complementary. As a result, in large cities low and high skills will experience
a higher increase in productivity and therefore in wages relative to medium skills, and vice versa in
small cities. This cannot be oset by higher house prices because those are determined by real wage
equalization at all skill levels, including the medium skilled. The higher real wages for low and high
skilled workers in large cities will attract those skill types into the large cities driving down nominal
wages until real wages equalized. This in-migration of low and high skilled workers leads to the fat tails
in the large cities.
We now discuss some further implications of the model.
Housing Consumption and Expenditure. It is immediate from our model that in large cities, citizens
will spend more on housing, yet they will consume less of it.
Proposition 2 Let A1 > A2 and H1 = H2. For a given skill i, expenditure on housing pjh?
ij is higher
in larger cities. The size of houses h?
ij in larger cities is smaller.
Proof. From the consumer's problem, we have: pjhij = wij. Then, since we established in the proof
of Proposition 1, that wi1 > wi2, we must have p1hi1 > p2hi2; 8i. Similarly, from the same equality in






which implies hi1 < hi2.
Then given homothetic preferences for consumption, it immediately follows that:
Corollary 1 Expenditure on the consumption good is higher in larger cities.
Our model predicts that expenditure on both housing and consumption is higher in larger cities,
though the equilibrium quantity of housing h?
ij is lower. As cities become larger (or as the dierence
12in TFP increases), at all skill levels total income increases and therefore total expenditure increases.
Because house prices increase as well, there will be substitution away from housing to the consumption
good. As a result, inequality in consumption expenditure will increase.
Firm Size. It immediately follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that rm size is increasing in city
size. By assumption, there is a representative rm within a given city, and the rm size in city j is
given by
P
i mij. Due to the free entry condition for rms and the ensuing general equilibrium eects,
the representative rm is larger in larger cities. Firm size is given by Sj = Nj
P
i mij, and is increasing
in city size. It is ambiguous whether the number of rms Nj is larger in larger cities.
Corollary 2 Firms are larger in the larger cities.
In the data section, we will verify how rm size changes across cities.
Labor Productivity and TFP. Even though large cities attract low skilled workers, those low skilled
workers are more productive in large cites. In fact, as we pointed out earlier, the wage and therefore
labor productivity in the largest cities is on average 25% larger than that in the smallest cities in our
sample. Even under CES, more low skilled workers go to large cities because their productivity is higher
there (though they do this in xed proportions under CES). When the elasticity is varying, then in
addition, the larger marginal product i for scarce skills relative to abundant skills makes the labor
productivity of the scarce skills even larger in large cities.
Given the wage distribution within the city, house prices and the city size, we can infer information
about the underlying productivity. For example, for the two-city economy, all else equal, an increase in
the city size of the largest city is driven by an increase in TFP in that city. Our model is static, and
therefore silent on the evolution of wages across cities.
5 The Empirical Evidence of Fat Tails
5.1 Empirical Strategy
We use the one-to-one relation between skills and equilibrium utility to back out the skill distribution
from easily observable variables. The worker's indirect utility in equilibrium is independent of the city,
given perfect mobility, and assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences, it satises





where we need to observe the distribution of wages wij by city j, the housing price level pj by city and
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Figure 3: Wage distribution for small and large cities. Full-time wage earners from 2009 CPS. A. Ker-
nel density estimtates (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth = 0.1), not adjusted for top-coding; B. Em-
pirical CDF, accounting for top-coding.
5.2 Data
The analysis is performed at the city level. We dene a city as a Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA), the
most comprehensive functional denition of metropolitan areas published by the Oce of Management
and Budget (OMB) in 2000. See Table 1 for examples of cities and their 2009 population.
[ Insert Table 1 here ]
We use wage data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the year 2009. We observe weekly
earnings for 102,577 full-time workers in 257 U.S. metropolitan areas. CPS wages are top-coded at
around $150,000 which we will take into account in the statistical analysis.
Local housing price levels are estimated using the 5% Public Use Microsample (PUMS) of the 2000
U.S. Census of Housing. We observe monthly rents for 3,274,198 housing units and assessed housing
values for 7,680,728 owner-occupied units in 533 CBSAs. The Census also reports the number of rooms
and bedrooms, the age of the structure, the number of units in the structure and whether the unit has
kitchen facilities. City specic price indices from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) based
on the Case and Shiller (1987) repeat sales method are used to adjust for 2000-2009 growth in housing
prices.
See the data appendix for more details on data source, sample restrictions and variables.
5.3 Wage distribution
Figure 3 shows the distribution of weekly wages for full-time earners both in cities with a population
of more than 2.5 million and cities with population between 100,000 and 1 million. We clearly see
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Figure 4: Wage distribution by population size. A. Mean (slope=0.046, s.e.=0.007); B. Standard
Deviation (slope=0.023, s.e.=0.003). Based on censored regression accounting for top-coding.
in large cities.8 A simple t-test shows that wages in large cities are 13.2% higher than in small ones
(t = 28:3;p < 0:000). Controlling for right censoring from top-coding and weights in a censored
(tobit) regression leads to almost exactly the same comparison:  log wage= 13:1% (robust t = 24:7,
p < 0:000). Figure 16 in the appendix draws the condence intervals of the distribution and also shows
that the dierence is signicant.
The above partitioning of wages into a group of small cities and a group of large cities ignores
substantial dierences across dierent cities of similar size. We therefore also relate the wage distribution
of individual cities to city size. We estimate the mean and the standard deviation of the right-censored
wage distribution for each city with maximum likelihood assuming log normality, i.e. a tobit regression
on a constant. Figure 4 plots these estimates against 2009 population size. We see that both average
wages and the variance of wages increases with population size. A simple linear regression estimates a
slope coecient of 0.046 for mean log wages (robust t = 6:89, p > 0:000) and of 0.023 (robust t = 7:87,
p > 0:000) for the standard deviation of log wages. On average, a one percent increase in the city
population leads to 0:046% increase in the wage. Table 2 shows the top 10 and bottom 10 cities with
respect to average wages.
[ Insert Table 2 here ]
5.4 Housing Prices
We model housing as a homogenous good h with a location specic per unit price pj. In practice,
however, housing diers in many observable dimensions. Observed housing prices therefore reect both
the location and the physical characteristics of the unit. Sieg et al. (2002) show the conditions under
8Note that the \bumps" in the top tail for both large and small cities are an artefact of the top-coded nominal wage
data.
15which housing can be treated as if it were homogenous and how to construct a price index for it. Take
our Cobb-Douglas utility function
u(c;h(z)) = c1 h(z)
and assume that housing h(z) is a function, for simplicity of exposition only, of two characteristics




The indirect utility given the market prices q1 and q2 for, respectively, characteristic z1 and z2 is then








where L = 1=[ (1   )
1 ]. Dening the price index p = Lq
1q1 
2 the indirect utility is
Ui =  (1   )
1  w
p
and thus identical to the one derived assuming homogenous housing h with market price p. The sub-
expenditure function e(q1;q2;h) is dened as the minimum expenditure necessary to obtain h units of
housing and given by
e(q1;q2;h) = Lq
1q1 
2 h = ph = pz
1z1 
2 :
Taking logarithms and assuming that we observe z1 but not z2 yields a linear hedonic regression model
log(ejn) = log(pj) + log(z1jn) + ujn
where en is the observed rental price of housing unit n and log(pj). We can therefore estimate the city
specic price level as location-specic xed eect in a simple hedonic regression of log rental prices on
the physical characteristics.
[ Insert Table 3 here ]
Table 3 shows the results of the hedonic regressions both for rental units and owner-occupied units
using Census data. We use all available housing characteristics in the data and add all categories
as dummy variables without functional form assumptions. All coecients are highly signicant with
expected signs: housing prices increase with the number of rooms and decrease with the age of the
structure. We nd a non-monotonic relationship in the numbers of units in the structure with highest
prices for single-family detached homes and buildings with more than 50 units.
We adjust our estimated price levels from the 2000 Census for 2000-2009 price changes using data
from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). Table 4 shows the resulting house price indices for
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population < 1m > 2.5m
Figure 5: Skill distribution for small and large cities. A. Kernel density estimates (Epanechnikov kernel,
bandwidth = 0.1), not adjusted for city-specic top-coding; B. Empirical CDF adjusted for top-coding
using the Kaplan-Meier method.
[ Insert Table 4 here ]
5.5 Skill distribution
Davis and Ortalo-Magn e (2007) document that expenditure shares on housing are remarkably constant
across U.S. metropolitan areas with a median expenditure share of 0:24. We use this as our estimate
of . Together with our estimate for local housing prices pj we can back out the indirect utility uij for
the observed wages using equation (5).
Figure 5 shows the distribution of skills for full-time earners both in cities with a population of
more than 2.5 million and cities with population between 100,000 and 1 million. In contrast to the
wage distribution, the skill distribution in large cities is only marginally shifted to the right. However,
both the upper and the lower tail of the distribution is thicker in the large cities thus conrming the
theoretical prediction of fat tails.9 Figure 16 in the appendix also draws condence intervals of the
distribution and shows that the dierence is signicant.
The above partitioning of skills into a group of small cities and a group of large cities ignores
substantial dierences across dierent cities of similar size. We therefore estimate the mean and the
standard deviation of the skill distribution for each city. As with wages, we take into account the city-
specic right censoring from top-coded wages by estimating a censored (tobit) regression on a constant.
The top two graphs in Figure 6 plot these estimates against 2009 population size. We see that while
average skills vary little with population size, the standard deviation increases substantially. A simple
linear regression estimates a slope coecient of 0.016 for mean log utility (robust t = 2:21, p > 0:028)
9Note again that the \bumps" in the top tail are due to top coding, see footnote 8. Top-codes appear more to the left
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Figure 6: Skill distribution by population size. Left graphs: Mean; Right graphs: Standard Deviation.
Top graphs: linear regression (slope average=0.016 (s.e.=0.007); slope st.dev.=0.023 (s.e.=0.003)). Bottom
graphs: local linear regression (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth = 0.58 and 0.74, respectively)
and of 0.023 (robust t = 7:61, p > 0:000) for the standard deviation of log utility. The lower two graphs
in Figure 6 show non-parametric local linear regressions for the size relationship and 95% condence
intervals. Both the parametric and non-parametric estimates clearly conrm the fat tail hypothesis.
Table 5 shows the top 10 and bottom 10 cities with respect to average wages.
[ Insert Table 5 here ]
[ Insert Table 6 here ]
As we did in the introduction, to emphasize the fat tails result, in Figure 7 we reproduce the
dierence of the density functions. In panel A, the ratio of wages in large cities relative to small cities
is increasing in wages, thus illustrating that relative wages are monotoic. In panel B, the relative
densities of the utilities is non-monotonic. It is important here to point out that the decrease in the pdf
dierences at the very top skill levels is driven by the top coding. Note that for large cities the impact
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pdf(pop > 2.5m) − pdf(pop < 1m)
Figure 7: A. Density dierential of wages between large and small cities; B. Density dierential of skills
between large and small cities.
6 Direct Measures of Skills
As a robustness check and as external validation, we compare our implicit skill distribution with ob-
served measures of skill. Figure 8.A. shows the distribution of educational attainment for the same CPS
population as our wage data, where workers are grouped in 7 education categories. The same pattern as
with our implicit measure arises: both the highest and the lowest skilled workers are disproportionately
more frequent in larger cities than in smaller ones.
This can be observed even more transparently when we group the education levels into three groups.
This is reported in Figure 8.B. What is most striking about this observation is that the fat tails in the
distribution of educational attainment is obtained independently of how we constructed our measure of
skills before. Here, no theory is needed and the measure of skills is determined exogenously.
The fat tails in the distribution of educational attainment in larger cities can also be established at
the individual city level. Below in Figure 9, we report the scatter plot of the variance of educational
attainment when educational attainment categories are given a score corresponding to the years of
schooling.
Like in the case where the skill measure is derived from the wage distribution, when we use an
observable, reported measure of skill, we nd little correlation between city size and average skill, but
a signicant and positive relation between city size and the standard deviation of the skill measure.
Using observable, self-reported measures of skills { either education categories or years of schooling
{ we nd a distribution with fatter tails in larger cities, both in the aggregate and at the individual
city level.
The key identifying assumption to derive the skill distribution from wages is perfect mobility of




















































































































































population < 1m > 2.5m
Figure 8: Observed educational attainment for small and large cities. Highest completed grade of
full-time wage earner in 2009 CPS. A. Grouped in 7 categories; B. Grouped in 3 categories.
worker is the same across dierent cities. Here we can verify whether this assumption holds when we
use observable skills instead. Note that utility need not be equalized for identical observed skill levels
across dierent cities when our predicted skill level is imperfectly correlated with the observable skill
measure. Nonetheless, it is instructive to investigate how average utility (wages corrected for house
prices) vary across dierent city size conditional on the observed skill group.
In Table 7 we report the linear regression by observable skill group of the average utility and of
its standard deviation on city size (Figure 17 depicts for each skill category the scatter plot for each
city together with the regression line). Before discussing the ndings, an important caveat is due.
By dividing workers in subgroups, some of the subgroups include city-education subgroup that have
not enough observations to calculate the mean and standard deviation. Those with city-education
subgroups with less than two observations are dropped. The lack of observations is most acute in the
highest skill categories. Table 7 reports the number of cities N in each skill category out of all 253 cities
where there are at least two observations. Because the censoring of the data may well be systematic,
these results should be taken as merely indicative.
[ Insert Table 7 here ]
For what the data is worth, we nd that by observable education category, in 6 out of the 7 groups
utilities (real wages) do not signicantly vary with city size. The one exception is the group with the
Master degrees. This eect is strong enough to render the overall eect to be positive as well, though
the eect is small. This seems to indicate that there is some systematic variation of wages across cities
for this education group. For example, there could be systematic variation in the location decision and
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Figure 9: Distribution of educational attainment (translated into years) by population size. Left
graphs: Mean; Right graphs: Standard Deviation. Top graphs: linear regression (slope average=0.12
(s.e.=0.03); slope st.dev.=0.12 (s.e.=0.02)). Bottom graphs: local linear regression (Epanechnikov
kernel, bandwidth = 0.53 and 0.67, respectively)
This indicates that on average our price-theory measure of skills appears to be quite correlated with
the measure from observable skills. What the remainder of the table suggests is that even within each
observable skill category there is residual heterogeneity in skills. In each skill category, the standard
deviation of utility (real wages) is increasing in city size. Even within the observable skill category
(degree obtained), there is systematic sorting of the highest and lowest skilled types into large cities
and those that are medium skilled locate in medium sized cities. This holds true for all seven skill
categories. This is consistent with the well-known nding that a large part of wage heterogeneity is not
explained by observable skills (see for example Keane and Wolpin (1997)).
217 Discussion and Extensions
7.1 Firm size
In our model, rm size is endogenous. We can therefore identify primitive parameters from the empirical
rm size distribution. We use Census data10 on the number of employees and establishments for counties
or CBSAs. This allows us to calculate the average number of employees per establishment by city,
Figure 10 reports the average rm size by city size. The linear regression coecient is positive
and signicant. The kernel estimate is inverted U-shaped, though the downward sloping portion is not
signicant. In terms of the magnitude, the average rm size increases between 15 and 17 employees,
from simple inspection of the kernel estimate.11
We can exploit the fact that theory pins down the relation between TFP and house prices. From






. This therefore implies that












where we use the equilibrium condition of mobility across cities that the wage ratio must be proportional
to the price ratio. TFP in the largest cities in our sample is at least 25% higher than that in the smallest
cities (with a population around 160,000). The fact that the TFP is larger than labor productivity is
due to free entry of rms and the fact that the cost of entry depends on the house price index and is
therefore dierent across cities.
7.2 The Role of Migration
Casual observation suggests that large cities tend to have a disproportionate representation of low
skilled immigrant workers. Often kitchen sta in restaurants or construction workers are immigrants
with low skills and incomes. And indeed, while foreign borns are overall a relatively small fraction of
the working population (less than 10%), the data conrms that they are much more likely to locate
in large cities (12% of the work force) than in small cities (5%). Maybe the eect of disproportionate
representation of the low skilled in large cities is driven by immigration.
In the context of our model it does not matter whether it is the low skilled Americans or low skilled
immigrants who disproportionately locate in large cities. In equilibrium they should be indierent. Of
course, there is likely to be within-skill heterogeneity (in preferences for example), and some low skilled
workers will strictly prefer to locate in either large or small cities. While we do not model this, in
equilibrium there should still be arbitrage by the marginal worker within a skill type. Thus it may
10County Business Patterns, U.S. Census: http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/index.html.
11For the service sector, Holmes and Stevens (2003) nd a positive relation between city size and establishment size, and
a negative relation in manufacturing. Given the modest size of the manufacturing sector (9% of all non-farm employment {



























12 13 14 15 16 17
log population


























12 13 14 15 16 17
log population
kernel regression line 95% confidence bounds
Figure 10: Average rm size by city population: A. linear regression (slope=0.62 (s.e.=0.14)); B. local
linear regression (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth=0:58).
well be the case that migrants have certain benets from locating in large cities. For example networks
(see Munshi (2003)) play an important role for the location decision of migrants, and if only migrants
have that benet, at a competitively set wage, migrants will strictly prefer to locate in the city that
oers the same utility plus the network benet. Alternatively, migrants may locate in large cities due
to limited information about smaller cities.
In any event, because even with those additional benets for migrants, or any within skill hetero-
geneity, the model still predicts that in equilibrium, low skilled workers disproportionally move into
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Figure 11: Skill distribution: A. Foreign born workers; B. Natives.
To evaluate the role of migrants in the location decision, we split the sample up into natives and
foreign born workers. Figure 11 reports the plot of both distributions. Not surprisingly, the implied
23skill distribution for the foreign born is more skewed to the left than that of the natives. We nd that
even the distribution of foreign born workers has fat tails, both for the low and the high skilled. The
latter is maybe most surprising: not only do the low skilled foreign born disproportionately migrate to
large cities, so do the high skilled migrants. Most importantly, even after subtracting all the migrants,
the distribution of natives has fatter tails in large cities. The fat tails are therefore not exclusively
driven by non-natives.
7.3 Alternative Measures of Local Housing Prices
Local housing prices are crucial in our strategy to back out skills from observed nominal wages. In the
previous sections, we use rental prices from the 2000 U.S. Census (5% PUMS) and adjust them both for
observed hedonic characteristics of the rental units and for the 2000-2009 growth of local house prices.
In this section, we check whether our strategy is robust to using dierent measures of local housing
prices.
First, we use house values for owner-occupied units in the 2000 U.S. Census. The advantage over
rental prices is that there are about twice as many observed units, that the sub-market of owner-
occupied units is more relevant to the majority of households and that the hedonic regression ts the
prices data much better (compare the R2 in Table 3). The big disadvantage is that house values are
not market values but the own assessment of the house owner. The top row in gure 12 shows the
distribution of skills using house values instead of rental prices. The resulting skill distributions are
qualitatively identical to the ones derived from Census rental prices.
Second, we use data for 2009 from the National Association of Realtors (NAR). The house price
reects median sales prices of existing single-family homes by metropolitan statistical area (MSA). This
data has the advantage that it reports real market transactions; it also corrects for house characteristics
focusing on a single house type only. The disadvantage is that single-family homes are not representative
in some metro ares (think of Manhattan) and that the data are contributed from private sources (the
realtors) potentially leading to a selective sample with systematic measurement errors. The middle row
in gure 12 shows the distribution of skills using house prices from the NAR. Again, the resulting skill
distributions are qualitatively identical to the ones derived from Census rental prices.
Third, we use the local housing price index from the ACCRA Cost of Living Index from C2ER
(The Council for Community and Economic Research). This price index is a composite from monthly
principal and interest payment for a new house (single-family detached house, newly built and not
previously occupied) and monthly apartment rents. The advantage of this data is the very explicit
combination of owner-occupied and rental units and the very exact description of the representative unit
sampled (structure, location, etc.). The disadvantage is again the errors from volunteer data providers
(see also the details in the next section). The bottom row in gure 12 shows the distribution of skills
using house price index from ACCRA. Once again, the resulting skill distributions are qualitatively
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Figure 12: Skill distribution using alternative measures for local housing prices: Top graphs: U.S.
Census, house value 2000, adjusted for hedonic characteristics and 2000-2009 price growth; Middle
graphs: National Association of Realtors, median house value 2009; Bottom graphs: ACCRA, local
housing price index. Left graphs: density; Right graphs: Density dierential.
257.4 Variation in Consumption Prices
In this section, we investigate the role of systematic variation in consumption prices across dierent
cities. Maybe consumption prices in large cities are systematically higher than in smaller cities, thus
adding also further to the real cost of living in large cities. We use the ACCRA Cost of Living Index
from C2ER (The Council for Community and Economic Research). ACCRA reports local prices for 60
goods such as e.g., a sausage, a house, a phone call, gasoline, the drug Lipitor, or a haircut. The data
is collected by volunteers from the local chamber of commerce and then used to build price indices for
the six broad consumption categories: grocery items, housing, utilities, transportation, health care and
services. ACCRA is the only data for price comparisons across a large set of MSAs. Koo et al. (2000)
discuss several problems of the ACCRA data. Besides being collected by volunteers and stemming from
a very limited set of items, the most fundamental critique is the lack of proper adjustment for quality
dierences.
The rst nding is that the variation in consumption prices is substantially lower than in housing
prices (standard deviation across metropolitan areas is 30.1 for the housing prices index compared to
9.6 for grocery items, 14.7 for utilities, 6.7 for transport, 8.9 for health and 6.9 for services; all prices
indices are normalized to mean 100).
Figure 13 plots the distribution of skills for large and small cities. The measure is wages adjusted
for local price dierences in all goods categories reported in the ACCRA data, including housing,
consumption goods and services.12 When including the price index for all consumption and housing,
we nd that the left tail dierence becomes more pronounced while the right tail dierence less so.
This indicates that consumption prices are systematically higher in larger cities, but to a limited extent
since this eect does not annihilate the existing of fat tails. Note again, that the the third crossing at
the very top is an artefact of the top-coding (see footnote 9).
These ndings should be interpreted with some caution and a few caveats are due. First, the
quality of the ACCRA data is dubious. Second, even within a given location, there could be variation
in consumption prices paid by skill level. For example, due to dierent search intensity, the existence
of locally segregated markets, etc., the low skilled may end up paying dierent prices for similar goods
within the same city. Using scanner data on household purchases, Broda, Leibtag and Weinstein (2009)
nd that the poor pay less. Third, data consisting of price indexes and price surveys are likely to
not fully account for quality and diversity dierences. Due to their size, large cities have more variety
on oer and the quality of goods may dier substantially across dierent cities. Even if a consumer
is paying higher prices, a price index incorporating the diversity and quality on oer will be lower.
This also appears to be an issue when studying price dierences across dierent countries. Comparing
12ACCRA reports a composite price index which is the weighted average of the sixsub-indices, i.e. Pcomposite =
groceryPgrocery + ::: + servicesPservices, where the s are the expenditure shares of the six categories summing up
to 1. We do not use this aggregation as it is inconsistent with Cobb-Douglas utility. Instead, we use Pcomposite =
(Pgrocery)
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Figure 13: Skill distribution using ACCRA cost-of-living index, adjusting for variation in prices for all
goods; Left graphs: density; Right graphs: Density dierential.
the results of price dierences across borders, Broda and Weinstein (2008) nd that signicant price
dierences that are found using price indexes are not replicated once they use US and Canadian barcode
data. Their work is supportive of simple pricing models where the degree of market segmentation across
the border is similar to that within borders. We therefore see panel A in Figure 13 as a very conservative
upper bound of how the inclusion of consumption price dierentials aects our initial ndings.
7.5 A Micro-foundation for VES: Spillovers from Skill Diversity
So far we have been agnostic about what determines the VES technology. It is well documented that
agglomeration externalities are important (see for example Davis, Fisher and Whited (2009) among
many others). Here we propose a simple micro-foundation for the technology with varying elasticities
of substitution that generates the fat tails, and that is derived from spillovers across skill types.









This technology is completely standard CES except for the fact that there is a knowledge spillover
a() = m
()
ij that aects the marginal productivity of the worker. Knowledge spillovers are generated
by the input of diversely skilled workers. Having a dierent viewpoint helps solve a problem (e.g., the
input from the baggage loader at Southwest airlines on the performance of the logistics manager to
streamline luggage ows). There is no spillover from meeting a same skilled type as that knowledge
is already embodied in your own skill. We assume that spillovers arise whenever individuals meet,
which occurs through uniform random matching. So if a worker meets one other worker per period, the












and increasing. The nature of the spillover is illustrated in Figure 14.




Figure 14: A. Spillover technology (), increasing in measure of other skills; B. The marginal product
(mij) (and the Elasticity of Substitution ) are decreasing in abundance of skill.













and introducing the notation (Mi) = 
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+ where (Mi) is a decreasing function, we can









Irrespective of the functional form of (), the important implication of this formulation of the technology
is that it is a variation on the standard CES technology, except for the fact that the elasticity varies
by skill. This Varying Elasticity of Substitution (VES) technology of course is no longer homothetic.
There is still a direct relation between () and the elasticity of substitution ik between skill i and k
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28where i = (Mi) and k = (Mk). Observe that if i = k = , the technology is CES and this
expression simplies to the usual constant elasticity  = 1
1 : The technology with varying elasticity is










Figure 15: Scarce skill types are more likely to interact with agents with dierent skills and therefore,
given m, they benet from a larger expected spillover.
7.6 Unemployment
One alternative explanation for the fat tails may emanate from market frictions (see for example Eeck-
hout and Kircher (2010), Eeckhout, Lentz and Roys (2010), Gautier, Svarer and Teulings (2010) and
Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010)). Consider a CES technology but with search frictions. Then
more abundant skill types will face a relatively high unemployment to vacancy ratio, whereas scarce
skill types face a low ratio. This drives a wedge between the marginal productivity and wages. In a
labor market without an urban dimension, Eeckhout, Lentz and Roys (2010) show in a directed search
model that this leads to fatter tails in the more productive rms. It remains to be veried though that
empirically the unemployment rate both for high and low skilled workers is substantially higher.
Consideration of search frictions immediately brings up the issue of dynamics, currently completely
absent in our analysis. Possibly cities of dierent size and TFP oer dierent earnings paths. Those
with a steeper earnings path will induce workers to accept lower wages early on which over the entire
path leaves them indierent. This now potentially becomes a hairy dynamic problem. An important
related empirical and modeling issue to be addressed in a dynamic framework is the age distribution
across cities. Young people move into cities to move out again at middle age. This indicates that the
benets of large cities is non-monotonic over the life cycle which renders the dynamic implications of
29the model a priori ambiguous. Given the complexity of the issue, we leave dynamics for future work.
Nonetheless, the approach adopted by Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) in solving for a dynamic
spatial equilibrium will certainly be promising also here. They show that under certain assumptions on
the distribution of property rights, such a complicated dynamic problem leads to static optimization.
This also indicates that our static approach is appropriate.
Finally, yet another alternative explanation can be found in the division of labor. Based on a model
of specialization, Duranton and Jayet (2010) nd evidence using French data, that scarce occupations
are overrepresented in larger cities.
8 Conclusion
We have proposed a tractable theory of spatially dispersed production with perfectly mobile heteroge-
neous inputs, skilled labor. Dierences in TFP lead to dierences in demand for skills across cities. In
general equilibrium, wages and house prices clear the labor and housing markets. Perfect mobility of
citizens leads to utility equalization by skill.
We show that cities with a higher TFP are larger and that a CES production technology entails
identical skill distributions across cities with dierent productivity. When the elasticity of substitution
varies across skills such that it is higher for scarce skills, the skill distribution in larger cities exhibits
fatter tails.
We nd empirical support for our theory using US data. Adjusting wages for the compensating
dierentials of house prices by means of a hedonic price index, we nd skill distributions that have
fatter tails in larger cities. Our measure of skill derives directly from wages, and includes therefore
also unobservable determinants of skills. For external validation, we also use a measure of observable
skills only { educational attainment { and nd the same results. Of course, in order to capture the
non-monotonic relation in the demand for skills, the partition of skill classes must be suciently ne.
The fact that we nd the same result when we use skill measures based on both observables and
unobservables and measures based on observables only is indicative of the robustness of the result. A
wage based skill measure is not only attractive because it incorporates unobservable characteristics of
skill, by construction it is also measured as a continuous variable. While partitioning worker types in
two classes of high and low skilled is useful for many questions at hand, it precludes identication of
non-linear relations, let alone non-monotonic relations.
30Appendix A: Theory
Proof of Theorem 1



























































































































































The density at any skill level i is simply the ratio of the measure of that skill over the total measure,








































































Therefore, both distributions are identical and equal to the economy-wide distribution.
Proof of Proposition 1
First we prove the following Lemma concerning the housing prices.
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: From Z < 1, we know that Z
1
i 1 > 1,














Now, we prove the Proposition:








































































1 i > 0, it immediately follows that p2 < p1.








































i 1  1 for some















< 1: Therefore, Z < 1:
From Lemma 1, this imply that mi1 > mi2: Therefore, each individual rm in city 1 is bigger than


















































































i 1 > 1; for every i. This implies that
















Now we can compare the size of cities 1 and 2 :














































































Therefore S1 > S2:
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Denote the mode of the skill distribution by i. Then the distribution is uni-modal if for all
i0 > i, Mi0 > Mi when i;i0  i and Mi0 < Mi when i;i0  i.
From the assumptions in the theorem and by the proof of Proposition 1, we know that Z < 1 and
therefore Z
1































































First, we write the ratio of densities in both cities for the highest skills i = I (given a symmetric






























It now also becomes clear that for a small enough grid of skills (i.e., I large), this inequality will also
hold for skills in the neighborhood of i = I: i = I   1;I   2;:::






























Again, the inequality will continue to hold even in a neighborhood of i provided the grid of skills is ne
enough.
As a result, the distribution in city 1, the high TFP city, has fatter tails and less density around
the mode. From Proposition 1 we also know that city 1 - the high TFP city - is larger. Therefore the
larger city has fatter tails.
Elasticity of Substitution

















Following Silberberg, the Elasticity of Substitution is given by:
 =  




2f11   2f1f2f12 + f2
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Notice that if i = k = , this expression simplies to 1
1 :Appendix B: Data
Wage Data
Wage data is taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS), a joint eort between the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Census Bureau.13 The CPS is a monthly survey and used by the U.S.
Government to calculate the ocial unemployment and labor force participation gures. We the 2009
merged outgoing rotation groups (MORG) as provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) 14. The MORG are extracts of the basic monthly data during the household's fourth and eighth
month in the survey, when usual weekly hours/earnings are asked.
We use the variable `earnwke' as created by the NBER.15 This variable reports earnings per week
in the current job. It includes overtime, tips and commissions. For hourly workers, Item 25a (\How
many hours per week does...usually work at this job?") times Item 25c (\How much does ...earn per
hour?") appears here. For weekly workers, Item 25d (\How much does...usually earn per week at this
job before deductions?") appears here.
We restrict the sample to full time workers (between 36 and 60 usual hours per week). We also
drop the lowest 0.5% of wages as a pragmatic way of eliminating likely misreported wages close to zero.
Our nal wage sample includes 102,599 workers out of the 320,941 surveyed persons. CPS wage data
is in 2009 top-coded at a weekly wage of 2884.61 USD which applies to 2616 or 2.5% of workers. All
estimations use the weights in variable `earnwt' provided by the NBER.
The NBER version of the CPS identies the core-based statistical area (CBSA) of the observation.
It use the the New England city and town areas (NECTA) denition and codes for metro areas in the
6 New England states and the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) denition and codes
for all other states.
Local house and commodity price indices
We use the 5% Public Use Micro Sample (PUMS) of the 2000 U.S. Census. The U.S. is a decennial
random sample of housing units across the U.S. The data is provided by the Minnesota Population
Center in its Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).16
The variable `rent' reports the monthly contract rent for rental units and the variable `valueh' the
value of housing units in contemporary dollars. We also use all the reported housing characteristics of
the unit: `rooms' is the number of rooms, `bedrooms' is the number of bedrooms, `unitsstr' is the units
in structure (in 8 groups), `builtyr' is the age of structure (in 9 age groups) and `kitchen' is a dummy
variable if the unit has kitchen or cooking facilities.
We drop housing units in group quarters, farmhouses, drop mobile homes, trailers, boats, and tents
and only use data from housing units in identied metropolitan or micropolitan core based statistical
areas (CBSA). Our nal sample contains 3,274,198 rental and 7,680,728 owner occupied units.
The 5% PUMS discloses the co-called Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA). PUMA's are areas
with a maximum of 179,405 housing units and only partly overlap with political borders of towns
and counties. We use the Geographic Correspondence Engine with Census 2000 Geography from the
Missouri Census Data Center(MCDC) 17 to link PUMA areas to CBSAs. The MCDC data matches
every urban PUMA code to one or more CBSA codes and reports the fraction of housing units that are
13See http://www.bls.gov/cps/
14Stata data le available at http://www.nber.org/morg/annual/morg09.dta
15See details of the variable creation at the NBER website http://www.nber.org/cps/
16See Ruggles et al. (2010) for the data source and http://usa.ipums.org/usa/ for a detailed description of data and
variables.
17Available at http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html.matched. We assign a PUMA to a CBSA if this fraction is bigger than 33%. In cases where the PUMA
does not fully belong to a CBSA, we assign the PUMA to the CBSA where most of its housing units
belong to. Our nal sample contains data from 533 metropolitan or micropolitan core based statistical
areas (CBSA) out of a total of 940 existing CBSAs. Not that we do not use the metropolitan area code
provided in the PUMS in variable `metaread'. This variable reports a mixture of metropolitan area
codes (MSA, PMSA, central city or county) which is dicult to match with the CBSA denition.
We adjust our estimated price levels from the 2000 Census for the 2000-2009 price changes using
data from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).18. The FHFA publishes quarterly time series
of local house price indices for 384 CBSAs based on the Case and Shiller (1987) repeat sales method. 11
of the CBSAs are divided into 29 metropolitan divisions. We average these divisions over the respective
CBSA using the 2000 housing stock (provided by the MCDC) as weights.
For robustness checks, we also purchased the ACCRA Cost of Living Index from C2ER (The Council
for Community and Economic Research). ACCRA data are collected by local chambers of commerce
and similar organization who have volunteered to participate. They are reported for 269 core-based
statistical areas (CBSA) and 80 metropolitan divisions for the 33 largest CBSAs. The ACCRA Cost of
Living Index consists of six major categories: grocery items, housing, utilities, transportation, health
care, and miscellaneous goods and services. These major categories in turn are composed of subcate-
gories, each of which is represented by one or more items in the Index. In total, local prices of 60 items
are reported, e.g. tbone steak (item 1), phone (31), gasoline (33), Lipitor (38), pizza (40) haircut (42),
movie (52). Indices for major categories and an overall composite index are calculated as weighted
averages where weights come from the Consumer Expenditures Survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics. We use the average of quarterly data from Q2.2008 to Q2.2009 in order to mini-
mize the number of missing cities from non-reporting places. We use the average across metropolitan
divisions to match ACCRA data to our wage data.
For further robustness checks, we use data from the National Association of Realtors for the 4th
quarter in 2009. We use the median sales price of existing single-family homes for metropolitan areas.
MSAs are as dened by the U.S. Oce of Management and Budget and include the specied city or
cities and surrounding suburban areas.
Firm size distribution
Data on the local distribution of rm sizes is taken from the county business patterns compiled by U.S.
Census Bureau as an extract from its own Business Register (BR). Data for establishments are presented
by geographic area, 6-digit NAICS industry, legal form of organization (U.S. only), and employment
size class. Data consist of number of establishments, employment during the week of March 12, rst
quarter payroll, and annual payroll. We use aggregate data for 939 CBSAs in 2008.
18See http://www.fhfa.govAppendix C: Tables and Additional Figures
Table 1: Rank of cities by 2009 population.
City Population
1 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 19,069,796
2 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 12,874,797
3 Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 9,580,567
4 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 6,447,615
5 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 5,968,252
6 Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 5,867,489
7 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL 5,547,051
8 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 5,476,241
9 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 5,475,213
10 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 4,588,680
...
247 Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 163,370
248 Parkersburg-Marietta-Vienna, WV-OH 160,905
249 Niles-Benton Harbor, MI 160,472
250 Janesville, WI 160,155
251 Abilene, TX 160,070
252 Eau Claire, WI 160,018
253 Jackson, MI 159,828
254 Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA 159,587
255 Bend, OR 158,629
256 Thomasville-Lexington, NC 158,582
Notes: cities are dened as core based statistical areas (CBSA). The Oce of Management
and Budget (OMB) denes 940 metropolitan and micropolitan areas of which we use the
largest 256.
Table 2: Rank of cities by average log wages.
City Population Avg. Log Wage
1 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 901208 7.08
2 Barnstable Town, MA 221151 7.05
3 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 4317853 6.99
4 Boulder, CO 303482 6.98
5 Ann Arbor, MI 347563 6.96
6 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 5476241 6.95
7 Worcester, MA 803701 6.95
8 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 802983 6.94
9 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 1839700 6.93
10 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 4588680 6.93
...
247 Johnson City, TN 197381 6.38
248 Utica-Rome, NY 293280 6.38
249 Waco, TX 233378 6.37
250 Madera-Chowchilla, CA 148632 6.36
251 El Paso, TX 751296 6.35
252 Lynchburg, VA 247447 6.32
253 Jacksonville, NC 173064 6.31
254 Laredo, TX 241438 6.30
255 Amarillo, TX 246474 6.28
256 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 396371 6.26
Notes: Wages from CPS. Averages from tobit regression accounting for top-coding.Table 3: Hedonic regressions for rental and owner-occupied units.
log rent log value
Number of rooms
1 { {
2 0.1344*** (0.0018) 0.1753*** (0.0058)
3 0.1793*** (0.0019) 0.3770*** (0.0055)
4 0.2703*** (0.0019) 0.3914*** (0.0055)
5 0.3345*** (0.0020) 0.5437*** (0.0055)
6 0.4182*** (0.0021) 0.7087*** (0.0055)
7 0.4933*** (0.0025) 0.8805*** (0.0055)
8 0.5470*** (0.0029) 1.0411*** (0.0055)
9+ 0.5839*** (0.0032) 1.3040*** (0.0055)
Age of structure
1 year { {
2-5 years -0.0332*** (0.0034) -0.0516*** (0.0014)
6-10 years -0.0978*** (0.0033) -0.1260*** (0.0014)
11-20 years -0.1836*** (0.0031) -0.2441*** (0.0013)
21-30 years -0.2612*** (0.0031) -0.3692*** (0.0013)
31-40 years -0.3145*** (0.0031) -0.4310*** (0.0014)
41-50 years -0.3560*** (0.0032) -0.4818*** (0.0014)
51-60 years -0.3974*** (0.0032) -0.5579*** (0.0014)
61+ years -0.3772*** (0.0031) -0.5606*** (0.0014)
Units in structure
1-family detached { {
1-family attached -0.0805*** (0.0014) -0.2059*** (0.0009)
2-family -0.0875*** (0.0012) 0.0143*** (0.0015)
3-4 family -0.1017*** (0.0012) 0.0158*** (0.0021)
5-9 family -0.1068*** (0.0012) -0.1578*** (0.0027)
10-19 family -0.0550*** (0.0013) -0.1982*** (0.0032)
20-49 family -0.0865*** (0.0015) -0.0803*** (0.0031)
50+ family -0.0647*** (0.0013) 0.0452*** (0.0024)
not available -0.0366*** (0.0028) -0.0058*** (0.0010)
Bedroom to room ratio 0.1488*** (0.0027) 0.2824*** (0.0020)
Dummy kitchen 0.0417*** (0.0031) 0.3138*** (0.0035)
Constant 6.0817*** (0.0060) 10.8201*** (0.0067)




Notes: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
Reference groups are indicated by "{".Table 4: Rank of cities by estimated housing price index.
City Population Rent Index
1 Honolulu, HI 907,574 1312.76
2 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 1,839,700 1252.62
3 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 12,874,797 1157.05
4 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 4,317,853 1148.75
5 Washington-Arlington-Alex., DC-VA-MD-WV 5,476,241 1142.28
6 New York-New Jersey-Long Isl., NY-NJ-PA 19,069,796 1118.46
7 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA 407,057 1117.70
8 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 802,983 1095.97
9 Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 256,218 1012.10
10 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 3,053,793 1001.02
...
244 Lawton, OK 113,228 330.28
245 Anniston-Oxford, AL 114,081 329.33
246 Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI 200,050 325.06
247 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH 285,624 323.11
248 Decatur, AL 151,399 321.53
249 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 396,371 320.61
250 Flint, MI 424,043 316.47
251 Johnstown, PA 143,998 307.73
252 Monroe, LA 174,086 297.80
253 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 741,152 291.55
Notes: Housing price indices based on hedonic regressions using 2000 U.S. Census data and
adjusted for 2000-2009 price changes with reapeat-sales indices from the Federal Housing Finance
Agency.
Table 5: Rank of cities by average of log utility.
City Population Average utility
1 Ann Arbor, MI 347563 4.88
2 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 901208 4.88
3 Barnstable Town, MA 221151 4.87
4 Jackson, MI 159828 4.86
5 Worcester, MA 803701 4.85
6 Flint, MI 424043 4.84
7 Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 4403437 4.81
8 Boulder, CO 303482 4.81
9 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 1195998 4.79
10 Decatur, AL 151399 4.79
...
244 Honolulu, HI 907574 4.35
245 Laredo, TX 241438 4.33
246 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 396371 4.32
247 Utica-Rome, NY 293280 4.32
248 El Paso, TX 751296 4.31
249 Chico, CA 220577 4.30
250 Lynchburg, VA 247447 4.30
251 Madera-Chowchilla, CA 148632 4.28
252 Amarillo, TX 246474 4.25
253 Jacksonville, NC 173064 4.22Table 6: Rank of cities by variance of log utility.
City Population S.D. Utility
1 Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 256218 0.77
2 Punta Gorda, FL 156952 0.77
3 Boulder, CO 303482 0.71
4 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 1839700 0.69
5 Springeld, OH 139671 0.69
6 Springeld, IL 208182 0.68
7 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 901208 0.68
8 Lubbock, TX 276659 0.67
9 Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 501228 0.66
10 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 19069796 0.66
...
244 Myrtle Beach-North Myrtle Beach-Conway, SC 263868 0.43
245 Bellingham, WA 200434 0.42
246 Lynchburg, VA 247447 0.42
247 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 317538 0.42
248 Anderson, IN 131417 0.41
249 Macon, GA 231576 0.40
250 Appleton, WI 221894 0.40
251 Panama City-Lynn Haven-Panama City Beach, FL 164767 0.38
252 Janesville, WI 160155 0.37
253 Waco, TX 233378 0.37
Table 7: Regression coecient on 2009 population size of average and standard devia-
tion of real wage by skill category.
average standard deviation N
Skill Category
1 No high school -0.011 (0.013) 0.042*** (0.008) 160
2 High school degree -0.003 (0.009) 0.033*** (0.005) 249
3 Some college 0.003 (0.007) 0.022*** (0.004) 247
4 Bachelor 0.005 (0.009) 0.030*** (0.006) 237
5 Master 0.049*** (0.017) 0.039*** (0.011) 168
6 MD,... -0.022 (0.044) 0.018 (0.034) 57
7 PhD -0.023 (0.041) 0.015 (0.025) 55
All skill categories 0.016** (0.007) 0.023*** (0.003) 254
Notes: 1. For many small cities we oberve less than two workers in the very low and very high education
groups and cannot estimate the standard deviation. These city-group pairs are dropped; the samples
on which the regressions are based do therefore systematically vary and the results are only indicative.
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Figure 16: Wage and skill distribution for small and large cities with optimal band width and 95%-
condence intervals. Full-time wage earners from 2009 CPS. Kernel density estimtates (Epanechnikov
kernel), not accounting for top-coding. Bandwidth point estimate: 0.06497 (small cities), 0.06690 (large
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Figure 17: Skill distribution by population size conditional on 7 observed educational levels. Left
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Figure 17: continued.References
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